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1. Introduction 
We use a general computational framework for brain function to develop a theory of 
the self. The theory is that the self is an inferred model of endogenous, deeply hidden 
causes of behavior. The general framework for brain function on which we base this 
theory is that the brain is fundamentally an organ for prediction error minimization. 
 
There are three related parts to this project. In the first part (Sections 2-3), we explain 
how prediction error minimization must lead to the inference of a network of deeply 
hidden endogenous causes. The key concept here is that prediction error minimization 
in the long term approximates hierarchical Bayesian inference, where the hierarchy is 
critical to understand the place of the self, and the body, in the world. 
 
In the second part (Sections 4-5), we discuss why such a set of hidden endogenous 
causes should qualify as a self. We show how a comprehensive prediction error 
minimization account can accommodate key characteristics of the self. It turns out 
that, though the modelled endogenous causes are just some among other inferred 
causes of sensory input, the model is special in being, in a certain sense, a model of 
itself. 
 
                                                
* Acknowledgements. We wish to thank the editors Adrian Alsmith and Frederique de 
Vignemont, and Jennifer Windt as well as participants in The Body and the Self workshop in 
Copenhagen 2015, for comments on earlier versions.  JH is funded by Australian Research 
Council FT100100322 and DP160102770. JM is funded by the European Research Council 
ERC STG 679092. 
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The third part (Sections 6-7) identifies a threat from such self-modelling: how can a 
self-model be accurate if it represents itself? We propose that we learn to be who we 
are through a positive feedback loop: from infancy onward, humans apply agent-
models to understand what other agents are up to in their environment, and actively 
align themselves with those models. Accurate self-models arise and are sustained as a 
natural consequence of humans’ skill in modeling and interacting with each other.  
 
The concluding section situates this inferentialist yet realist theory of the self with 
respect to narrative conceptions of the self. 
 
2. Bayesian inference and prediction error minimization 
On the picture of the human brain that we shall work with, organisms like us 
construct internal models of the world in order to interact meaningfully in our 
environment. The inputs that our senses receive are caused by objects and states of 
affairs in the world, including other people and endogenous states of our own bodies. 
Sensory input is all the brain has to go by in constructing its model of the world 
(Helmholtz 1867). A series of sensory inputs is a sample of some size, for example, 
samples for an estimate of the location of a flash of light. Such a sample will be 
subject to noise, and we can assume it will be normally distributed (i.e., a Gaussian 
distribution). This is what the brain has to work with in its attempt to learn the true 
cause (the location of the flash of light). Assume for simplicity that samples come in 
one at a time. The brain needs to learn something for each sample, so that it can arrive 
at an estimate of the true, underlying cause. The first sample comes in and suggests 
location a, so the brain represents the location as location a. The next sample comes 
in and suggests location b. Now the brain could stick to location a, but would then 
have learned nothing from the second sample; this strategy is tantamount to assuming 
falsely that a first sample is veridical and the rest misleading. The brain could switch 
to location b, but would then have thrown out all information carried by the first 
sample; this strategy is an example of overfitting. Instead, a location between the two 
samples should be picked: a location, m, that results from weighting the existing 
evidence against the new evidence. 
 
This is an exceedingly simple example, but it is instructive. Notice that the estimate of 
location m is a model fitted to the samples, and that the brain never receives direct 
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confirmation of this inferred location. In other words, if the sensory input is noisy, 
then the brain must be entertaining internal models that are in some sense removed 
from the states of affairs – the hidden causes – that are being modeled. 
 
Bayes’ rule specifies the optimal location of m, namely in terms of the probability of 
location a, also known as the prior – what is already believed – and the probability of 
the new sample given location a, also known as the likelihood. Bayesian inference is 
the process of updating the prior in the light of the new evidence to arrive at a new 
estimate – the posterior. In inference, the prior works as a prediction (“the next input 
will be a”), and the likelihood encodes the prediction error, which would be zero if 
the next sample were indeed a. In our example, the new prediction error is b, so the 
prediction error is (a – b).  Crucially, the amount learned from this prediction error 
should depend on how robust the prior and likelihoods are. If it is not sample one and 
two, but sample 1001 and 1002, then even a large prediction error should not change 
the posterior very much; similarly, if the prediction error itself is very noisy then it 
should not be allowed to update the posterior very much. Bayes’ rule takes care of 
this weighting. It turns out that for a normal distribution, this estimate turns out to be 
the mean, hence ‘m’. 
 
Consider now what happens to the long-term average of prediction error as Bayesian 
inference converges on the mean. There will still be prediction error for every new, 
noisy sample. Most samples will be within a couple of standard deviations, and there 
will be some outliers, but overall, by sticking to m, error will be minimized. In 
contrast, any other, non-Bayesian, estimate will tend to create greater error in the long 
run (e.g., if the true mean is 0, and the samples -1 and 1, then a non-Bayesian estimate 
of -3 will generate a prediction error of 6 rather than 2) (for this approach to Bayes in 
terms of relative precisions, and subsequent application to hierarchical learning, see 
(Mathys, Daunizeau et al. 2012, Mathys, Lomakina et al. 2014)). 
 
If Bayesian inference is prediction error minimization, then (assuming normal 
distributions) any system that minimizes prediction error in the long run will be 
approximating Bayesian inference. This is crucial to appreciate how the brain solves 
the problem of building a model of the world on the basis of sensory input.  
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It is not plausible to say that the brain knows and applies Bayes’ rule – neurons don’t 
know probability theory. But it is plausible to say that neuronal populations harbor 
expectations about what the sensory input should be, the strength of which is based on 
past learning. These expectations are compared against the actual input to extract the 
prediction error, and the activity of the neuronal population is adjusted in the light of 
the size and variance of the ensuing prediction error. 
 
In other words, it is plausible that the brain can minimize prediction error, even if it 
does not explicitly apply Bayes’ rule. Moreover, if the brain simply aims to keep 
prediction error as low as possible (taking into account irreducible noise and 
assuming normal distributions) on average and over the long run, then it will be 
guaranteed to approximate Bayesian inference (Friston 2003).  
 
This is the fundamental idea of predictive processing: a system, like the brain, that 
minimizes prediction error on the long-term average will approximate Bayesian 
inference. 
 
The challenges to prediction error minimization become much more prevalent in a 
world as complex as ours, where there is not just a single source of visual input but 
multiple interacting causes. In such an environment, the system must constantly 
assess hypotheses and compare them against each other to arrive at the best overall 
model. For example, the light, represented with the mean location m, may periodically 
disappear and thus create a situation where the absence of a predicted input causes a 
prediction error (cf. den Ouden, Friston et al. 2009).  The system may then try to 
introduce a further hidden cause into its model, also normally distributed, that 
represents an occluder (e.g., someone waving their hand in front of the light). Then 
the system may be able to get prediction error minimization back on track, when the 
causal interaction of the occluder and the light is correctly modeled.  
 
A prediction error minimization system in the real world, exposed to its manifold of 
causes, would build up a vast repertoire of beliefs about all sorts of hidden causes and 
their interactions. This would be hierarchically ordered in a spatiotemporal sense, 
such that small receptive fields and regularities operating at fast time scales would be 
at the bottom (e.g., the intensity and location of the light), and larger fields and longer 
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term causal regularities higher up (e.g., the movement of a hand periodically 
occluding the light). The hierarchy would also include expectations not just about 
means but also of the variances (or precisions) of the prediction errors it may 
encounter, in order for it to steer an informed route between underfitting and 
overfitting. 
 
The claim now is that we are like this (Hohwy 2013, Clark 2013, 2016). We manage 
to represent the world by being prediction error minimizers – neural mechanisms that 
realize Bayesian inference in the long run. Equivalently, we minimize uncertainty 
about our model of the world – accumulate evidence for it – by minimizing error. On 
some versions of the prediction error minimization framework, this is all we ever do 
(Friston 2010, Hohwy 2013, Hohwy 2015). 
 
If all we ever do is minimize prediction error, what could it mean to have a self? It 
seems prediction error minimization is just a matter of inferring causes in the world, 
so expecting there to be a self could appear as unreasonable as expecting the mean 
location of a series of visual samples, arrived at through Bayesian inference, to have a 
self. However, by working with the notion of a prediction error minimizing system we 
will show how it can in fact accommodate many of our preconceptions about the self.  
 
Interestingly, there are now a number of studies attempting to connect different 
aspects of body and self with the predictive processing framework. Our approach here 
builds upon an early approach developed in Hohwy 2007 and in Hohwy 2013 (Ch. 
12). It also resonates with and draws upon several other recent approaches, including 
Limanowski and Blankenburg (2013), who connect the framework to minimal 
phenomenal selfhood; Apps and Tsakiris (2014), who explain bodily self-awareness 
in terms of the framework; Seth, Suzuki et al. (2011), who focus on interoceptive 
predictive coding and self; Moutoussis, Fearon et al. (2014), who focus on predictive 
processes in the relation of self and other; Frith and Friston (2015), who focus on 
social understanding in terms of coupled oscillations of selves; Fotopolou (2012) and 
Carhart-Harris and Friston (2010), who connect the framework to psychodynamical 
notions of self; finally, an important precursor to the Bayesian approach is Thomas 
Metzinger’s (2004, 2009) work on self-models (see Limanowski and Blankenburg 
2013 for discussion). 
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In the simple example of a flash of light, we considered the possibility of causal 
interaction with other causes, such as an occluder making the light disappear 
periodically. Interactions create non-linearity in the sensory input that cannot be 
explained away well on the basis of a model of a simple, normal distribution. Instead, 
it becomes necessary to postulate multiple causes that, when convolved, are able to fit 
the sensory input. Of course, a good explanation for why a light periodically 
disappears could be that the perceiver is blinking their eyes, which technically 
speaking occludes the light source. If the perceiver models this, then they are 
modeling part of what happens to be their own body in order to minimise prediction 
error. This can be generalised and extended to any part of the body or the trajectory of 
the body as a whole (e.g., why are the flashes of light moving at an accelerating pace? 
You have begun a sprint; why is the chair creaking? You have put on weight). In this 
simple sense, modeling the body is the automatic upshot of prediction error 
minimisation, which allows perception of the world. A full body model will be 
finessed over time, as we accumulate evidence, learn about precisions, and learn how 
to actively test hypotheses through our own behavior (for discussion, see Hohwy 
2013: Ch. 1-4; Seth 2015). 
 
By taking the perspective of long-term prediction error minimization, it is thus quite 
easy to see how internal models of agents will end up including representations of the 
agent’s own body and its trajectories and interactions with other causes in the world. 
Agents will represent their own bodies simply because prediction error minimization 
of necessity leads to representing the worldly causes of the agent’s sensory input, and 
the agent’s body is in fact itself one of these causes. 
 
3. The self in the body 
Perception is perfused with the interaction of the body with the environment, 
mandating internal representation of the body. The body is nothing special, it is just 
one among many causes interacting with each other in the environment, and in the 
course of this impacting on the senses. Representation of the body is nothing special 
either; it is just one among many causes that get represented in the internal model 
used for prediction error minimization. 
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As we noticed, internal models need to be hierarchical to be efficient at minimizing 
prediction error in the long run. For example, in the short time scale, you might be 
well-served to use an umbrella whenever it rains, but it also helps to model how the 
seasons influence the probability of rainfall so you know better when to bring your 
umbrella. The long-term representation of seasons is higher in the hierarchy in the 
sense that it helps control the predictions of rainfall, and of course, perception of 
actual rainfall is evidence that filters upwards and helps to shape the long-term 
representations of seasons. Seasons are in this sense more deeply hidden causes than 
rainfall itself, they (or the tilt of the Earth’s rotational axis in its orbital plane) are 
causes that operate behind, but are perceivable in, the more directly observable 
causes, such as rainfall. 
 
As it is for rain and seasons, so also for the body and its more deeply hidden causes. 
For example, an agent who blinks at a normal rate will blink more when exposed to 
an unexpected, startling auditory stimulus. In this case, fear is an internal mental state 
that causally interacts with the body and thereby modulates the evolution of sensory 
input. Eye-blinks can also be brought about by a puff of air to the eye. Here we have 
an ambiguous situation where two different hypotheses could explain the same visual 
input: something scary or a mere puff of air. Contextual information such as 
additional auditory input or the presence of an air puffer can help disambiguate and 
arrive at the best hypothesis. Similar examples can be run for other cases of body-
involving prediction error. If you begin experiencing repeatedly removing yourself 
from parties and social get-togethers before everyone else, then there is, assuming you 
are normally keen to socialise, prediction error concerning the trajectory of your 
body. This can be explained away by hypothesizing that you are beginning to develop 
introversion as a character trait, or, as alternative hypotheses to test over time, social 
phobia, depression, or, again, as something non-self related the deterioration of your 
social scene.  
 
Over time, the overall internal model will be populated with states and parameters for 
not just the less hidden bodily causes of sensory input but also the more deeply hidden 
internal causes of the agent, which interact with each other (e.g., fear plus hunger 
gives one trajectory of sensory input, fear plus pain gives another) and in turn with 
worldly influences (e.g., fear and presence of tigers vs. fear and no presence of tigers). 
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The model of causes hidden within the body captures an integrated net of character 
traits, biases, reaction patterns, affections, standing beliefs, desires, intentions, base 
level internal states, and so on. This representation comes about through prediction 
error minimization just as naturally as representations of deep hidden causes in the 
wider environment, such as seasons. Without representation of these deep causes we 
would be much worse off in our ability to minimize moment-to-moment prediction 
error over the long run. Causes within the body can be thought of as endogenous (i.e., 
as changes initiated within the organism in a sense we will specify more below), and 
causes in the environment as exogenous (i.e., as changes initiated outside of the 
organism). 
 
Our proposal is to conceive of this internal model of endogenous causes as a 
representation of the self. The suggestion, then, is that agents model the self as a 
hierarchy of hidden, endogenous causes, and further, that the self is identical to these 
causes. As we shall explain later on, this modeling in turn becomes an endogenous 
cause serving to stabilize the hierarchy of causes constituting the self, so the self-
model is part of the self. Our proposal is motivated by the basic idea that who we are 
is determined by the regularities in our constitution that determine what we feel, think 
and decide, and how we act. This proposal sits well with earlier notions of self-
models, in particular Thomas Metzinger’s approach: “A self-model, an inner image of 
the organism as a whole [is] built into the world-model, and this is how the 
consciously experienced first-person perspective develop[s]” (2009: 64; see also 
2004). 
 
This proposal presents the self as more than a mere bundle of causes. The self-model 
is a hierarchical construct whose levels are linked by message-passing as top-down 
predictions are generated and bottom-up prediction errors minimized. For example, 
the agent’s desire for ice cream manifests every day but its magnitude is modulated 
by longer-term regularities associated with the desire to lose weight, which manifest 
predominantly at the beginning of the calendar year. All the parts of the self-model 
are thus tied together and interact causally with each other. This captures the idea that 
one’s self is comprised of both long-term characteristics and the expression of these in 
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shorter-term behaviours, and, vice versa, that our long term characteristics must 
depend on relatively stable patterns in our shorter-term behaviours. 
 
Over time, noise and uncertainty are filtered out of the self-model, just as they are in 
the modeling of the broader environment in which the self is causally enmeshed. This 
means that more coincidental events do not make it as parts of the self-model. For 
example, if one summer day the ice-cream loving agent by happenstance refrains 
from eating ice cream, this doesn’t mean the parameters of the self-model should be 
revised. If such coincidental events are included, then the self-model risks being 
overfitted to coincidentally varying behaviour, which is not so clearly self-related. 
However, if this kind of variability reduction happens too much, then the model 
becomes uninformative (underfitted) and fails to capture actual patterns of behaviour. 
This balancing act between overfitting and underfitting corresponds to what happens 
in any kind of Bayesian modeling, as described above. 
 
A balanced self-model of endogenous causes may be paraphrased in simple terms as a 
theory or narrative that appeals to regularities or plotlines at different, interlocked 
time scales. Such a theory or narrative can be seen as an answer to the question: 
which kind of agent am I? For a simplistic agent, this might be “I am an ice-cream 
loving person who worries about my weight, and this manifests in the way I go 
through life, where I am often eating ice-cream though I manage to refrain in the 
couple of months after my New Year’s resolution”. For realistic agents, the narrative 
will be very much longer and complicated. Crucially – and in contrast to narrative 
accounts of the self (as we will explain in more detail in Section 8) – this account 
does not imply that agents generally make such narratives fully explicit, nor that the 
narratives in questions take a linguistic form, nor that they are coherent in the sense of 
forming a coherent plot or story (cf. Dennett 1991, 1992, Velleman 2006, Hardcastle 
& Flanagan 1996). Rather, it is a narrative account, in the first instance, in the sense 
that the subsumption of events under higher-level regularities (i.e., hierarchical 
Bayes) structures and constrains our interpretation of those events. As we shall see 
later, in Section 6-7, the self-model is also narrative in the sense that it actively shapes 
itself over time to align with those higher-level regularities. 
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Above, we briefly noted that action is a useful tool for disambiguation of models of 
the body. The reliance on action is unsurprising on a prediction error minimization 
scheme since action is an efficient tool for reducing uncertainty in causal inference. 
Action, or intervention in the world, allows us to go beyond mere associative 
evidence (e.g., A is statistically associated with B) and on to learning causal relations 
(e.g., A causes B) (Pearl 2000, Woodward 2003). Accordingly, action is also crucial 
for forming the self-model – in shaping the narrative. For example, if you suspect that 
your fear of heights is subsiding then you may seek out tall buildings to accumulate 
evidence for this hypothesis. James Russell neatly ties action in with forming a 
conception – or model – of the self in causal terms: 
 
The freer we are to alter our perceptual inputs, the more we learn of the 
refractory nature of the world and, correlatively, the richer the conception we 
gain of ourselves as determiners of our immediate mental life. This 
refractoriness, therefore, sets limits on what our agency can achieve in 
determining our experiences, thereby engendering a conception in us of 
something as setting these limits, as causing them to be set (Russell 1995: 
134). 
 
Through action, the self-model stands out more sharply and with less uncertainty. Of 
course, we have also argued that it is action itself that leads to the need for a self-
model in the first place. The agent’s causal interaction with the world causes changes 
to sensory input of a kind that is best explained away by positing a body and a self. 
We thus represent the self because we in general are active creatures, and we act so 
that we can represent the self. This circularity is a springboard for discussing some of 
the deeper aspects of the prediction error minimization approach to the self (Sections 
4-5), as well as the developmental dynamics in the shaping of the self (Sections 6-7). 
 
4. Body, self, and existence 
The self-model is hierarchical, which means that it encompasses causal regularities 
governing events at many time scales. At the low levels of this hierarchy are 
regularities that represent the body and its movement, which happens at relatively fast 
time scales (e.g., 1-2 seconds for reaching, a few hours for moving around town to do 
the shopping). At intermediate levels are regularities that represent medium-term 
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endogenous causes (e.g., days for reading up for an exam, months for a new learning 
objective). At higher levels are stable regularities such as character traits (e.g., being 
fastidious). 
 
What we label the ‘self’ is constituted by more deeply hidden causes than what is 
represented in the body-model specifically. Given the hierarchical ordering of the 
overall model, this does not imply that body and self are separate entities. They are 
tied up in one causal nexus, just as daily rainfall and seasons are tied up together. We 
can certainly talk about the movement of the body on its own, and we can talk about 
dynamics of the self on its own, but it is very hard to understand or predict the 
movements of the body or the dynamics of the self without connecting them to each 
other in just the way hierarchical Bayes suggests. For example, knowing character 
traits enables predictions of bodily movement, and character traits that never manifest 
in bodily movement will quickly begin to look spurious. 
 
By treating body and self as just more hierarchical modeling of the causes in the 
world we thus get an appealing picture of body and self as separate and yet related. 
This makes good sense of core intuitions about body and self. When we speculate 
about the self it is hard to avoid involving thoughts about the body, and conversely, it 
is difficult to divorce thoughts about one’s own body from thoughts about one’s self. 
Yet our conceptions of body and self allow that they can be referred to separately 
(e.g., “my body may be old but I still feel young inside”). 
 
There is nothing special about this hierarchically mediated relation between body and 
self. The self-model represents them together, just as the model of the world 
represents snowfall and seasons together. One analogy here would be biological cells. 
Body and self are as connected as subcellular components are to the detailed activity 
at the cell-membrane. There is no great mystery in either case; the main difference 
would be that in the case of the body and self, there are causes at more levels of 
hierarchical depth than in the cell (even though cells are rather complex biological 
entities; see Friston 2013 for a prediction error minimization account of basic organic 
entities). 
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In his delightful thought experiment ‘Where am I?’, Dan Dennett (1981) imagines 
that his endogenous causes, harboured in the brain, are dislodged from the body but 
connected to it wirelessly. Dennett notes the profound uncertainty he feels in trying to 
locate himself either where his brain is or where his body is. We would feel the same 
kind of uncertainty if a similar thought experiment were made for the cell: is the cell 
where the membrane is or where the subcellular components are? We feel something 
has been left out of the story if either is ignored. The Bayesian explanation is simple: 
the causal hierarchy ties body and self (or membrane and subcellular components) 
together such that the processes in one only makes sense in the context of the other. 
The thought experiment works because on the one hand the mathematical detail is left 
unchanged such that the causal hierarchy is intact (Dennett’s body still is the lower 
level of the causal hierarchy and the endogenous causes in his brain at the higher 
levels). On the other hand the self-model is challenged because we have learned over 
time that the self and the body are co-located. In this sense, this type of philosophical 
reflection about the self is very similar to self-related illusions like the rubber hand 
illusion or full body illusion (Botvinick and Cohen 1998, Lenggenhager, Tadi et al. 
2007; see also the theoretical background for this work on self-models, developed by 
Metzinger 2004; 2009, which also challenge the core belief of spatial co-location 
associated with the self-model). 
 
We next offer a consideration about the self-model, which helps tie it to a very 
traditional notion of the self, namely that having or being a self is in some inchoate 
sense tied to existence or being – to the fact or thought that I am. At the low level of 
the overall self-model we have parameters representing the body. These parameters 
are modulated in part by higher-level causes, the set of which we identified with the 
self. We said that at the higher levels of the hierarchy we have stable regularities 
concerning, for example, character traits. At the very highest levels, details are 
stripped out and only more general beliefs are found. This leads, in the end, to just the 
belief that I exist. In the most ambitious versions of prediction error minimization 
schemes, which are based on free energy minimization, the belief that I exist is 
equivalent to the belief that I act to maintain myself in certain states (Friston and 
Stephan 2007; for further discussion, see Limanowski and Blankenburg 2013). The 
reasoning is that I cease to exist if I cannot maintain myself in a limited number of 
states, that is, if my body begins to disperse across many states. I must act to prevent 
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dispersion: inaction leaves me open to the unfettered impact of the second law of 
thermodynamics. So if I exist I must be acting, and if I act I must exist. Put 
differently, the highest-level belief is that I am a cause in the world, or an agent. This 
belief permeates all the levels below in the sense that they would all generate large 
prediction errors in the long run if agency ceased. Conversely, that highest level belief 
in being an agent is itself based on just the kind of Bayesian inference exemplified 
above: the best prediction error minimization is obtained by modeling the self and its 
body as partial causes of changes in sensory input. Here we see how the circularity 
mentioned earlier (I act to model myself and model myself because I act) is grounded 
in the free energy principle (for this kind of approach, see the free energy principle, 
Friston and Stephan 2007, Friston 2011). 
 
This speculative link to the free energy minimization account enables substantial 
characteristics of our conception of self to emerge from hierarchical Bayesian 
processing. Being a self is in a fundamental sense tied to existence and to agency, 
rather than merely to having a certain narrative, certain character traits, certain 
desires, or a certain bodily configuration. 
 
The hierarchical Bayesian perspective can be illustrated through David Hume’s 
famous failure to identify the self through introspection: 
 
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always 
stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, 
love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a 
perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception (Hume 1739-
40: B1.4.6) 
 
When he stumbles upon his perceptions he is reporting on low-level causes, and 
failing to report that the trajectory of sensory experience is governed by more deeply 
hidden causes, which are not directly perceivable in the same sense and yet are 
represented. Hume might as well have complained that he never perceives seasons but 
only snowfall, blooming flowers, ripening fruit and falling leaves. He is looking in the 
right place but focusing on the wrong timescale. As a result, Hume succumbs to what 
might be termed the short-timescale fallacy, failing to pick up the real patterns which 
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unfold at longer timescales and which underlie more rapidly fluctuating perceptual 
states. In particular, he fails to appreciate the more deeply hidden causes that pertain 
to his own interaction with the world and which are informed by the highest-level 
belief that he exists and is an agent in the world. 
 
5. The model that models itself 
The self is just one set of causes among other causes of sensory input. By minimizing 
prediction error, the self can be modeled just as other causes can be modeled. If the 
cause is a leafy tree in the environment, then the internal model represents that leafy 
tree. Seen from an outside, third-person perspective, there is clear separation of the 
causal relata – of the model and what is modeled. The model is harboured in the brain 
and the tree is outside the brain. The less the prediction error, the more the mutual 
information between them. 
 
The situation is less straightforward with the self-model and the self. Seen from the 
outside, third-person perspective, it is not immediately clear what the causal relata 
are. In some sense, the self-model must be representing itself rather than things 
external to itself. But this notion of self-representation is somewhat mystifying. 
Metzinger discusses this, explaining a weak version of the self in terms of “a self-
organising and self-sustaining physical system that can represent itself on the level of 
global availability” 2009: 208. Metzinger denies the existence of a self in a stronger 
sense, based on the idea that the self-model is a mere process, a “biological data 
format” (ibid.; see also Metzinger 2011). We agree with much of this but below we 
offer a seemingly more metaphysically robust account of self-representation in terms 
of inferred hidden causes. 
 
Consider first that inference of the deeply hidden causes constituting the self is 
mediated through the impact of these causes on less deeply hidden non-self causes in 
the body and the environment – these are the states the agent can control through 
action. Blinking or moving a cup are examples of this. For inference of other hidden 
causes such as seasons, migrations, and economic downturns, the causal flow can be 
pictured as relatively straight, going through deeply hidden to less deeply hidden 
causes, and then together impacting on the sensory organs of the organism in question 
and shaping its internal model. In the case of the self, this flow simply bends back on 
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itself such that the deeply hidden causes stem from the organism itself. This is part of 
what is modeled: the self-model represents the circular character of the causal flow. 
 
The notion of self-involving circular causation does not wholly demystify self-
modeling. This is because it is clear that action must be central to understanding what 
is going on: without action there would be no need to posit endogenous causes to 
explain changes in prediction error. It will therefore help to clarify what action is, 
according to the prediction error minimization approach. 
 
Above we noted that a system that minimizes prediction error on average and in the 
long run will approximate Bayesian inference. Prediction error can be minimized by 
changing the model to fit the data, as happens in perception. But prediction error can 
obviously also be minimized by acting in the world. For example, you move the 
source of sound to the location you expect it to be at. Since average long-run 
prediction error minimization will approximate Bayesian inference, it follows that 
considered in the long term, action is inference just as much as perception is; it is 
active inference (Friston, Daunizeau et al. 2009). Inference is the job of the model, so 
active inference too stems from the model. It follows that the part of the model that is 
involved in active inference is the self: this part of the model (the active states and 
their more deeply hidden causes) are the very endogenous causes that can be inferred 
in perceptual inference, which therefore become part of the self-model that in turn, in 
a dynamic downstream manner, shape active inference. 
 
Self-modeling can now be demystified further. The self is modeled in perceptual 
inference, as the system learns what its own self is. What is learnt are hierarchical 
patterns of active inference: the deeply hidden expectations that the system relies 
upon in active inference (for example, a pattern may be that you consistently move 
classical music sound sources closer to yourself, but other types of music further 
away, revealing something about your deeper desires). The self-model’s learnt 
patterns of active inference in turn inform the next volley of active inference (e.g., 
relocating to Vienna to make classical music encounters more likely). If this process 
manages to keep prediction error low on average and over the long run, then 
uncertainty about the model is gradually reduced. The model thus comes to know 
itself – represent itself – through action (as anticipated in the quote by Russell above). 
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It is worth taking a moment to let the strangeness of this idea sink in. It may seem that 
there must be ways of reducing prediction error about the self other than revising the 
self-model. In particular, it seems that I could simply move to a new environment that 
does not elicit behavior from me which generates the prediction error. For example, if 
I notice that I have been attending lots of Schönberg concerts even though I don't 
believe myself to be a fan of atonal music, do I really need to revise my self-model in 
order to do away with the discrepancy? Can't I just move to a place where there is no 
possibility of going to Schönberg concerts (Wyoming?). In fact, however, this would 
be a form of active inference, and its successful execution (i.e. choosing a place where 
there really is no Schönberg to tempt me) would require me to be sensitive to just the 
right hidden cause in myself (when offered the opportunity to listen to Schönberg, I 
tend to take it). In other words, it turns out that this move, too, would constitute a 
form of Bayesian inference about my self. 
 
Self-modeling as a process of coming to learn one’s own model through action 
implies that there are two related stages in the flow of activity in the brain of a 
prediction error minimizing agent from sensory states, impacted by the worldly 
causes, through the internal states and on to the active states that enslave bodily 
movement, which in turn affect changes in the world’s hidden causes. The key is that 
active states are the downstream effects of what we have called deeply hidden 
endogenous states, and these endogenous states are the downstream effects of sensory 
states. Self-modeling is thereby a process that can be described in causal terms, as 
first finessing a model of the self, and then engaging that model in action, leading to 
further finessing of the model, and more action. (This approach applies the notion of a 
Markov blanket, which is essential to the free energy principle (cf. Friston 2013), to 
the case of the self). 
 
For this dynamic inferential process to make sense, it cannot be that any inference 
about the patterns of active inference is as good as any other; the self-model would be 
cluttered with all sorts of more or less plausible beliefs, and prediction error would 
not be minimized. But since some actions are more likely than others to minimize 
prediction error, the system is constrained insofar as it needs to learn which patterns 
of active inference are associated with long-term prediction error minimization. That 
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information is available to the model, since prediction error is the one quantity the 
brain can compute. This means that patterns of active inference can be ranked 
according to their ability to minimize error. 
 
A ranking of patterns of active inference will facilitate decision-making, on the 
assumption that agents believe they will occupy low prediction error states in the long 
run (i.e., that they will exist). This in turn implies that the highly ranked patterns will 
reflect how probable it is that the agent harbours these patterns, that is, that those 
patterns go into constituting the self. In other words, the better the pattern of active 
inference is at minimizing error, the more likely it is that it belongs to the agent. This 
is because the agent has learnt one overarching belief, as we mentioned above, 
namely that it exists as an agent – as an active prediction error minimizer in the long 
run. The mere belief in existence therefore makes it probable that the agent harbours 
patterns of active inference that are good at minimizing error in the long run. Self-
related prediction error minimization will infer to those well-performing patterns over 
poor performing patterns, and they will then become part of what we here call the 
self. This means the self-modeling approximates Bayesian inference about the self, 
through action, because it minimizes error in the long run, fundamentally with respect 
to the hypothesis that the agent exists. 
 
Of course, a self-model will only minimize prediction error in the long run if it can 
maintain a fairly high degree of accuracy. Given the circular causality associated with 
self-modelling, it may seem that the process can float free of any constraints. To 
address this concern, we will (in the next two sections) explain in some detail how to 
think about accuracy for such a self-modelling system. The core idea is that self-
models and selves are fitted together as a natural consequence of humans’ skill in 
modeling and interacting with each other. More concretely, infants and young 
children apply agent-models to others during the course of development, and use 
these agent-models to guide imitation and other forms of cultural learning. From the 
perspective of the prediction error minimization framework, this appears as a form of 
active inference: infants and young children shape their selves progressively to match 
the agent models that they have been using to interpret others. Thus, the predictive 
processing framework is able not just to underpin key notions of body and self but 
also to provide us with a novel way of thinking about recent findings from 
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developmental psychology pertaining to cultural learning and the development of 
self-understanding.  
 
6. Agent-Modeling, and Cultural Learning as Active Inference  
There is a wealth of research in developmental psychology suggesting that infants 
differentiate between agents, on the one hand, and non-agents on the other. In 
particular, they are sensitive to core features of agents, such as faces and gaze 
direction (Senju and Csibra 2008; Farroni et al. 2002), as well as contingent motion 
(Gergely and Watson 1996; Carey 2009).  
 
Over the course of the first year of life, this sensitivity to such features comes 
increasingly to inform and be informed by representations of agents’ goals 
(Woodward 1998), of their strategies for attaining those goals (Gergely and Csibra 
2003), and of basic mental states such as attention (Reddy 2003, emotions (Stern 
1985) and intentions (Behne et al. 2005). Indeed, there is an ever-increasing body of 
evidence suggesting that infants are able to represent and reason about other agents’ 
beliefs by the second year of life (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Surian et al., 2007; 
for reviews, see Christensen & Michael, 2015; Michael & Christensen, in press; 
Apperly, 2011, chap. 3; Baillargeon et al., 2010), and perhaps as early as the middle 
of the first year (Kovacs et al., 2010; Southgate et al., 2014). 
 
What this evidence indicates is that infants and young children not only identify 
agents as a subset of the objects around them, but that they are predicting the behavior 
of those agents by applying an increasingly hierarchical model of what agents are 
like: Agents have particular desires and preferences, which they act upon in ways that 
are informed and constrained by doxastic representations which in turn are acquired 
through perception and through inferences.  
 
We will now explain how the application of an agent-model, in particular in infancy 
and early childhood, supports imitation and other forms of cultural learning. For 
present purposes, we will adopt Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner’s (1993) conception of 
cultural learning as a form of learning which depends upon learners and teachers 
understanding each other as beings who ‘have intentional and mental lives like their 
own’ (Tomasello 1999, 7). 
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One important type of cultural learning is imitative learning. Following Tomasello 
(1999; cf. also Tomasello et al. 2005) we will regard imitation (which is sensitive to 
an observed agent’s goals and strategies), but not emulation (where the learner 
focuses on the environmental effect of an observed action) as a type of cultural 
learning. In other words, imitation relies upon a deeper model of the observed agent’s 
mental states in their relation to her movements and to the environmental affordances 
and constraints. When engaged in imitative learning, the learner understands the agent 
as rationally selecting an appropriate sequence of actions to realize a goal. From about 
18 months, infants tend to imitate incomplete but intended actions rather than 
replicating the exact behavior they have seen, e.g. when an agent tries but fails to 
close a drawer (Meltzoff 1995). This demonstrates that they are modeling other 
agents' intentions and using those intentions to structure and guide their own learning. 
Similarly, Gergely et al. 2002 have found evidence that, by around 14 months, infants 
are able to selectively imitate features of an action that are relevant to the goal of the 
action, and to ignore extraneous or idiosyncratic features. In other words, they 
interpret observed agents’ behavior in terms of goals and rational strategies to attain 
those goals, and their imitative learning is guided by this interpretation. 
 
These findings indicate that, in order to understand what the adults in their 
environment are up to, children apply agent-models which are structured by coherent 
relations among mental states, environmental constraints and affordances, and bodily 
movements. In addition, however, it also reveals that children have a tendency to 
align themselves actively with what those adults are up to – at least with what those 
adults appear to be up to when viewed through the lense of the agent-models which 
children apply to them.  
 
This is perhaps most obviously the case for imitation, since it involves children 
manifestly acting to align themselves with a model. But it is also just as true, though 
perhaps more subtly, for other forms of cultural learning. In social-referencing 
situations, for example, which occur by around 9 months (Baldwin and Moses 1994) 
and perhaps as earlier as 5-6 months (Vaillant-Molina et al 2012), infants are sensitive 
to the objects of caregivers’ emotional expressions and adopt those attitudes toward 
the same objects. That is, infants treat as dangerous or disgusting objects toward 
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which the caregiver has expressed fear or disgust. Here we see how the emotional 
evaluation of the object is influenced by a sophisticated understanding of the adult’s 
visual attention in order to track not only the type of emotional state but also its 
intentional object, and to adopt an emotion of the same type toward the same 
intentional object. 
 
Furthermore, there has been a great deal of research documenting how children’s 
understanding of adults’ attentional states and intentions is crucial for language 
acquisition. For example, if an adult announces her intention to ‘find the toma’ and 
then searches in a number of locations, scowling upon seeing some objects and 
smiling upon seeing one object, children will learn the new word ‘toma’ for the object 
the adult smiles at (Tomasello and Barton 1994). In fact, Southgate et al. (2010) found 
that 17 month-olds learned to apply a novel word (‘sefu’) to a toy that an adult falsely 
believed was hidden in a box if the adult pointed at that box and pronounced the word 
(after being out of the room while the toy was moved from the box to a different 
location) (for a review of several similar studies, see Tomasello 1999: 114-116). 
Moreover, as Tomasello (1999) has emphasized, language acquisition gets going 
around 12 months, at which time children engage in triadic interactions with an adult 
and an object, and exhibit pointing behavior to inform others of events they do not 
know about or to share an attitude about mutually attended events others already 
know about (Liszkowski et al 2007). As with the case of imitation, then, we see that 
language-learning also requires children to apply agent-models to others, and to 
actively align themselves with those agent-models.  
 
These central forms of cultural learning also provide the foundation for additional, 
more nuanced and elaborate forms of cultural learning further downstream. Language, 
for example, enables a multitude of further effects upon cognitive development – 
“from exposing children to factual information to transforming the way they 
understand and cognitively represent the world by providing them with multiple, 
sometimes conflicting, perspective upon phenomena” (Tomasello 1999:163). In 
acquiring a natural language, children learn to partition the world into objects and 
events in a way specific to their culture, and to categorize the objects and events so 
partitioned, and to take different perspectives upon them. Thus, one object can be 
described as “the dog”, “fido”, “the dog over there”, “the golden retriever”, etc., and 
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one event can be described as “The dog bit the man”, “The man was bitten by the 
dog”, “Fido bit Daddy”, etc. Which of these descriptions is appropriate depends upon 
the speaker’s communicative goals and upon her evaluation of the listener’s interests, 
knowledge, etc. The ability to switch among these perspectives and to deploy them 
flexibly is entrenched through early experiences of disagreeing with others who take 
different perspectives and in re-formulating utterances that have not been understood. 
Language also enables children to internalize rules, to memorize information and 
procedures, to talk about their own reasoning processes and other experiences, and to 
re-describe previously implicit procedural knowledge in explicit symbolic terms, thus 
enabling greater flexibility and systematicity. 
 
Moreover, sensitivity to others’ mental states is also of crucial importance in 
understanding all manner of norms that structure human sociality, since these derive 
their binding force not from physical facts but from agreement in people’s attitudes 
about the statuses of entities, the entitlements and obligations they entail, etc. (cf. 
Searle 1995; Gilbert 1990). And there is evidence that children as young as two are 
sensitive to conventional ways of doing things or using objects, and treat these 
conventions as normatively binding (Rakoczy et al. 2008; Schmidt et al. 2010).  
 
Finally, language is also important in shaping children’s emerging understanding of 
themselves as unique individuals with their own preferences, as well as their own 
distinctive perspectives on and evaluations of events. In particular, as Fivush and 
Nelson (2004) have emphasized, talking about events together with adults helps 
children to become more fluent in linking their own emotions and other mental states 
with external events (e.g. I was sad because my balloon flew away). Moreover, shared 
remembering of past events, and of their own attitudes towards those events, helps 
children to develop a more reflective understanding of themselves as agents with 
distinctive perspectives on the world, some of whose thoughts and feelings can 
change over time, whereas some other mental states are much more lasting, such as 
some preferences, some beliefs, and many memories (Nelson 2003).  
 
The upshot of these various forms of cultural learning is that infants and young 
children progressively refine their agent-models through interaction with others, and 
also, through active inference, increasingly conform to those models themselves.   
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7. Active inference and the reciprocal shaping of self-models 
We have seen in the previous section that cultural learning can be conceptualized as a 
form of active inference by which children progressively converge upon the agent-
models which they initially apply to interpret other agents. One effect of this is that 
children become increasingly similar to the adults in their culture. More precisely, 
they become increasingly similar to the adults around them as those adults appear to 
them on the basis of the interpretations they generate by applying agent-models. This 
effect ensures that the application of agent-models during development increases the 
predictive power of those agent-models. For children’s use of agent-models will have 
shaped their own development such that they themselves approximate the intentional 
agents that they take others to be. And, if so, they will themselves be more easily 
intelligible for other interpreters who are also applying agent-models.  
 
The flip-side of this is that adults also apply agent-models toward young children, and 
that this also plays a key role in structuring children’s cognitive development, i.e. by 
setting up expectations for them to fulfill, and by acquainting them with culture-
specific objects, practices, narratives, social roles, etc. For example, gender-specific 
interpretations of infant behavior (such as boys’ cries more often being interpreted as 
expressions of anger as opposed to sadness) create expectations that children then 
conform to (Mameli 2001). Insofar as adults’ interpretation of young children as 
potentially rational intentional agents facilitates children’s enculturation, it also 
increases the predictive power of agent-models, and thus becomes, as Mameli (2001) 
puts it, a “self-fulfilling prophecy”.  
 
And of course this structuring effect1 of agent-models continues into adulthood. 
Consider, for example, how we sanction others for departing from rational or social 
norms. Thus, as McGeer (2007) puts it, folk psychology is “a regulative practice, 
moulding the way individuals act, think and operate so that they become well-
behaved folk-psychological agents: agents that can be well-predicted and explained 
                                                
1 Mameli (2001) coined the term “mindshaping” to denote this structuring effect of adults’ 
intentional interpretations of children; Zawidzki (2013, chapter 2) generalizes it to include 
cases, like imitative learning, where an agent actively converges upon some external model – 
such as models of other agents, generated by taking the intentional stance toward them. 
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using both the concepts and the rationalizing narrative structures of folk psychology” 
(139, emphasis in original). Similarly, Alfano (2013) has recently argued that similar 
ideas can play an important role in shaping people's ethical behavior: labelling 
somebody as generous, for example, may lead her to think of herself as generous 
and/or to believe that others think of her this way, and motivate her to want to live up 
to this expectation and to maintain this image. As he puts it: "Trait attributions of the 
right sort function as self-fulfilling prophecies" (2013: 83). 
 
Alfano's analysis also underscores the point that our interpretations of our own 
behavior and biographies have an influence on our own actions and choices, and are 
thus also sometimes self-fulfilling prophesies. Some research with split-brain patients 
serves as a dramatic illustration of this. One woman, whose right-hemisphere received 
the instruction that she should get up and leave the room, and who was then presented 
with a request to her left hemisphere to explain what she was doing (Gazzaniga, 1995: 
1393), confabulated that she had gotten up in order to get a soda – and, crucially, she 
then really did go and get a soda. Thus, to borrow Zawidzki’s gloss on this example: 
“whether or not our public self-interpretations are justified or true, we actively work 
to confirm them” (Zawidzki, 2013: 231).  
  
The mechanism proposed here is circular, but not viciously so. It does not require that 
young children have the intentional states ascribed by interpreters applying agent-
models, nor that agent-models have a high degree of predictive power when applied 
to very young children. It requires merely that young children have imprecise 
predictions to this effect about other agents and about themselves. If they do so, and if 
this provides them with role models to learn from and thereby to become more similar 
to, then they will develop in such a way that they subsequently become intelligible to 
others who also apply agent-models—including themselves. Moreover, becoming 
more like the agents in their culture they are modeling also adds to children’s 
interpretive resources, which, in turn, enable more learning and thereby more 
similarity, etc. In this sense, agent-modeling and cultural learning constitute a positive 
feedback loop. 
 
8. Is the Bayesian Self a Narrative Self? 
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As we have seen, the prediction error minimization framework presents an elegant 
and novel way of understanding how agents come to model the self, namely as a 
hierarchy of hidden endogenous causes, and of how human agents – through active 
inference in development and in social interaction throughout the lifespan – 
reciprocally align their selves with their agent-models. The upshot is increasing 
controllability and decreasing prediction error (for a fully developed view of 
alignment within the free energy principle, see Frith and Friston 2015, which 
essentially treats interaction as coupled oscillation that entails alignment). In this final 
section, we will flesh out this conception a little more by considering similarities it 
bears to narrative accounts of the self – but also some interesting differences.  
 
The key feature of narrative accounts is that the self is conceptualized as an 
abstraction emerging from autobiographical narratives. As Dennett, for example, has 
expressed this view:  
 
A self…is an abstraction defined by the myriad of attributions and 
interpretations (including self-attributions and self-interpretations) that have 
composed the biography of the living body whose centre of narrative gravity it 
is. As such it plays a singularly important role in the ongoing cognitive 
economy of that living body, because, of all the things in the environment an 
active body must make mental models of, none is more crucial than the model 
the agent has of itself (Dennett 1991, p. 427).  
And: 
And where is the thing your self-representation is about? It is wherever you 
are. And what is this thing? It’s nothing more than, and nothing less than, your 
centre of narrative gravity (Dennett 1991, p. 429).  
 
This approach is attractive insofar as it offers a way of conceptualizing the self as real 
and robust (like centers of gravity) without postulating mysterious immaterial entities. 
In fact, insofar as descriptions of the self and its traits can be used to identify 
behavioral and interactive patterns that facilitate predictions and to specify norms and 
ideals to conform to, it can also be a tool for structuring and controlling actions over 
time. Building on this point, Velleman (2006) articulates a narrative theory which 
emphasizes that the descriptions that constitute the self feed back into the decision-
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making and planning of the agent, and thus have real causal powers, akin to self-
fulfilling prophesies (see also Mackenzie, 2007; for discussion, see Menary 2008). 
 
Despite the prima facie attraction of the basic idea of the self as a narrative center of 
gravity, the metaphor of the narrative also raises several important questions and 
challenges. First of all, the concept of a narrative implies linguistic representation, and 
perhaps also explicit recounting. This implies that pre-linguistic children and non-
linguistic creatures do not have selves. And if they do have some more primitive form 
of self, it is difficult to see how a narrative self would arise from or otherwise relate to 
this more primitive form of self (Menary 2008). Secondly, as some (e.g. Strawson 
2015) have objected, the concept of a narrative appears to imply coherence, whereas 
in fact life (and one’s autobiographical memories) may seem more like a desultory 
collection of fragments than a coherently crafted narrative. Third, narrative accounts 
make it difficult to make sense of the possibility of error. While narratives about 
fictional characters are unconstrained by objective facts, it is possible to be mistaken 
in thinking that one is, for example, kind or well-loved. 
 
Like narrativist accounts, the account we have been articulating resolutely avoids 
postulating an immaterial entity as the bearer of psychological properties or of 
experiences. And, also like narrativist accounts, it stops short of eliminating 
altogether the self. Instead, it avoids Hume's short-timescale fallacy by understanding 
the self as an abstraction that is useful in recognizing deeply hidden, longer term 
patterns among endogenous psychological properties, experiences and sensory inputs.  
 
In contrast to narrative accounts, however, this account does not imply that the form 
of representation in question is linguistic (cf. narratives). Instead, it is a hierarchical 
Bayesian model that passes messages amongst its levels to reduce prediction error in 
the long term. One important consequence of this modification is that the account 
does not rely on narrative coherence (see Strawson’s objection above). This is 
because the self-model is not a representation of events or sequences of events in the 
life of the agent. Instead, it captures the hidden patterns of endogenous causes of 
those events. Different models can however have different depths. For example, a 
very shallow self-model will have trouble subsuming regular events under longer-
term regularities; conversely, an overly deep model will tend to explain irregular 
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happenstance as manifestations of longer-term regularities. This speaks to differing 
degrees of narrative coherence and the long-term task of arriving at a model of 
appropriate depth: a shallow model will have a fragmented narrative and a deep 
model will be more structured. Individual differences in the depth of the self-model 
are to be expected, given the dynamic nature of active self-alignment. 
 
However, no matter how deep or shallow the self-model, in order for it to contribute 
to the reduction of prediction error, a different kind of coherence is always required. 
Specifically, the hierarchically superordinate layers of the model can only have 
predictive power if the parameters that they include are really somehow connected to 
each other and to the parameters of hierarchically subordinate layers. For example, 
the postulation of clusters of psychological properties like preferences, beliefs, and 
personality traits must make it possible to generate predictions about behavior, and 
the error in predictions about behavior help shape the clusters of psychological 
properties. In other words, there must be a coherent link between these psychological 
properties, the behavior, other causes in the world, and back on to sensory input. The 
notion of coherence is here given a precise meaning, namely in terms of how a system 
that minimizes prediction error will approximate Bayesian inference ensuring that all 
levels are maximally predictive of each other (given expected levels of noise in the 
self-model). 
 
Finally, the account is better positioned than narrative accounts to explain how we can 
be wrong in our self-representations. The self is not merely the fictitious subject of a 
narrative. Instead, it is the set of endogenous causes being referred to by self-models, 
which are constrained by their embeddedness in a positive feedback loop constituted 
by worldly causes, bodily states, sensory states, internal states at various levels of 
causal depth, and active states.  
 
While this constitutes a departure from the way in which narrativist theorists such as 
Dennett have explicitly characterized the self, it is a departure that in fact builds upon 
core insights of narrative theorists. In particular, the developmental feedback loop we 
have described can be understood as the product of applying Dennett’s intentional 
stance theory to the development of self-understanding and the self: young children’s 
use of the intentional stance enables them to learn from and thereby to become more 
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similar to the adults in their culture. As a result, they themselves become increasingly 
intelligible to other people taking the intentional stance. Thus, the intentional stance 
and cultural learning constitute a feedback loop that (partially) explains the reliability 
of the intentional stance. Michael (2015) has even argued that this developmental 
perspective on the intentional stance – contra Dennett – provides grist to the mill for a 
causal realist interpretation of the reference of intentional terms and of the self, 
insofar the causal interaction between intentional interpretations of behavior and 
cognitive development provides an anchor that links intentional terms to the 
endogenous hidden causes constituting the self. 
 
This realist interpretation of intentional states and of self also means that – contra 
narrativism – correctness does enter into the picture with respect to the self. In 
particular, the agent can accumulate more or less evidence for a self-model over 
different time spans. Of course, it is often not a straightforward matter to evaluate the 
probability of an attribution of a psychological property, such as whether I am 
generous or hot-tempered. But the attribution is constrained by all the evidence that I 
have accumulated about myself, and can be contested by others who have access to an 
overlapping set of evidence about me. Thus, attributions of properties to the self can 
be more or less consistent with evidence, and they are open to revision according to 
how well they predict the evidence. 
 
In summary, the predictive processing approach to brain function has a central role 
for both body and self, as inferred entities in the world that are represented in the 
agent’s internal model of the world. The inference is based on filtering out patterns of 
causation that are best explained away by the model inferring that it is itself a cause of 
changes to its sensory input. Various aspects of this inferential account speak to the 
conception of the self as something more than mere inference but indeed something 
connected to existence and agency. These abstract ideas are not only consistent with 
recent research on self-conceptions in infants and young children, they allow us to see 
social interaction and cultural learning as key elements in the dynamic process of 
shaping one’s self through action and interaction. Overall, we arrive at an idea of the 
embodied self, which harkens back to but also significantly revises well-known 
narrative accounts of the self.  
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